356 (2001), the Supreme Court held that private parties may not seek money damages against state employers under Title I of the ADA. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Accordingly, sovereign immunity does not apply to suits brought by the Federal Government. By ratifying the Constitution, States consented to suits against them by the Federal Government. Rather, sovereign immunity applies “only in the absence of consent.” Alden, 527 U.S. 2007) (“overeign immunity does not prohibit all suits against a state.”), aff’d, 261 F.

But sovereign immunity “does not bar all judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law.” Alden v. It is true that this suit against the Sheriff in his official capacity is effectively a suit against the Commonwealth of Virginia. 58, 71 (1989) and (3) sovereign immunity bars suits against States, see generally Cash v. 727, 729 (1957) (2) a suit against a Virginia officer in his official capacity is a suit against Virginia, see Will v. The Sheriff argues that (1) he is a constitutional officer of the Commonwealth of Virginia, see Va. 128, 140 (1965) (“othing in or any other provision of the Constitution prevents or has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State’s being sued by the United States.”). 305, 312 n.4 (1987) see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar this action against a State by the United States, because “States retain no sovereign immunity as against the Federal Government.” West Virginia v. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar This Suit Against a State by the Federal Government 1982)(court considering a motion to dismiss “contend that a complaint simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based” affords the plaintiff “the same procedural protection as would receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration”). 662, 678 (2009)).Ī court considering either type of motion assumes that the facts alleged in the complaint are true and views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. “ claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jones, 16 F. To survive such a motion, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 12(b)(6), on the other hand, “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Jones v. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).Ī motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.

A court should grant such a motion “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Evans v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452 (4th Cir. P 12(b)(1) “addresses whether has a right to be in the district court at all and whether the court has the power to hear and dispose of claim.” Holloway v. Legal StandardĪ motion to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. In response, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. Hall to a vacant position for which she was qualified as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendants failed to reassign Ms. §§ 12111−12117, by discriminating against Emily Hall, a qualified individual with a disability. On March 2, 2016, the United States filed this action alleging that Defendants violated Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. To the extent that, as Defendants claim, the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office is legally identical to the Sheriff in his official capacity, the United States does not oppose dismissing the Office as a party. Defendants also argue that the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office should be dismissed as a party, because the Office is not sui juris. Hall’s employer under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court should reject these arguments, because sovereign immunity does not bar suits by the Federal Government against States, and the Complaint adequately pleads that the Sheriff, in his official capacity, was Ms. Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Complaint in its entirety, because, first, sovereign immunity bars the suit and, second, the Complaint does not adequately plead that the Sheriff, as an arm of the Commonwealth of Virginia, was Emily Hall’s employer. Woody, Jr., in his official capacity (the Sheriff), and the Richmond City Sheriff’s Office (collectively, Defendants), to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. Plaintiff, the United States of America, opposes the motion of Defendants, Sheriff C.T. UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

Sample response to motion to dismiss